European VAT principles based upon the jurisprudence of the CJEU. It then assesses that jurisprudence insofar as exclusions from the tax base are concerned, namely rules on VAT exemptions, and rules on VAT reduced rates, highlighting this dialectic struggle, and identifying both the Court's traditional stand on it, and its more recent approach. An empirical assessment of the hypothesis is then presented, by reviewing a five years sample of cases on the interpretation of the scope of VAT exemptions, and identifying for each case whether the CJEU decided on the basis of the principle of fiscal neutrality, or on the basis of the principle of strict interpretation. Whilst not meant to be taken as an accurate method of determining the Court's preferences as regards interpretative methods, the exercise demonstrates not only a growing preference for fiscal neutrality, but also the increasingly casuistic nature of interpreting VAT rules on exclusions of the tax base. The paper concludes that these tendencies are likely to continue in the face of new economic realities, and that the challenge for the CJEU will be to reach the right balance between promoting neutrality and eliminating distortions, without creating an environment of legal uncertainty, which will undermine confidence and economic growth.
II. EU VAT Principles
The EU VAT system is founded upon two basic principles, namely the principle of VAT as a general consumption tax, and the principle of fiscal neutrality. Based on key elements of the VAT system as it was introduced in the 1960s, they have been both developed by the Court as fundamental principles of the system over an extended period of nearly five decades.
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VAT to some services, the so-called difficult-to-tax services. Overtime, three additional explanations were given for the use of (merit) exemptions, and reduced rates, namely:
 Vertical equity: idea that these concessions limit the natural regressivity of VAT, i.e. that the tax weights more heavily on poorer households; so applying exemptions to key products (e.g. food, healthcare, and education) would limit the impact of the tax on those households;  Positive externalities: idea that these concessions increased consumption of so-called merit goods (e.g. books, cultural events and sport activities);
 Increase employment: idea that application of reduced rates will ultimately lead to increase employment in labourintensive industries (e.g., hairdressing), or areas where price is particularly elastic (e.g., electronics), or both (e.g., restaurants). 5 These exclusions from the tax base had, however, a very significant cost on neutrality.
II.2 VAT as a Neutral Tax
Whilst there are various definitions of neutrality, 6 generally, a neutral tax is one that does not influence commercial decisions.
Taken in that sense, the neutrality of VAT is usually held as one of main reasons for its introduction: in Europe this much is made clear in the Neumark Report, 7 which uses neutrality as the main argument for VAT against the -at the time common -use of cumulative taxes; 8 and worldwide, the spread of VAT to over 150 countries has been attributed to its technical advantages, most notably neutrality. 9
It is therefore unsurprising that the principle of VAT as a neutral tax was enshrined in First VAT Directive, and was quickly developed by the CJEU as the principle of fiscal neutrality in its early case-law. Whilst is not always clear how VAT legal principles interact, a typology is proposed in Table 1 . 13 According to this proposed typology, the principle of the right to deduct has been developed by the Court as both a corollary of the fiscal neutrality principle, and of the principle of VAT as a general tax on consumption. The principle of fiscal neutrality has another corollary, namely the principle of VAT uniformity or equal treatment; and the principle of VAT as a general tax on consumption has two corollaries, namely the principle of strict interpretation, as developed by the Court, and the destination principle, as set out in the Directive.
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III. Role of Neutrality on Interpretation of Exemptions
The role of the two fundamental principles of the VAT system, namely the principle of VAT as a general tax on consumption, and the principle of fiscal neutrality, as interpretative aids is reflected in the CJEU interpretation of the exemptions' provisions.
III.1 Traditional Approach
The initial interpretation by the CJEU of VAT exemptions was clearly influenced by the principle of VAT as a tax on consumption. Faced with growing number of references from the early 1990s onwards, Court quickly developed general guidelines on interpretation of exemptions:
' This is not to say that strict interpretation was always adhered to; on the contrary, the first cases departing from strict interpretation date back to the late 1990s. These can be broadly divided into two types. The first are cases concerning technical exemptions, particularly those applicable to financial services, which depart from strict interpretation, but not explicitly based on the principle of fiscal neutrality; 18 resorting to the principle of fiscal neutrality was less necessary in these cases, since the wording of the financial services exemptions does not always limit their subjective scope, and the cases concerned primarily outsourcing and sub-contracting. 19 The second type are cases concerning merit exemptions, particularly those applied to medical activities, which explicitly depart from strict interpretation on the basis of the principle of fiscal neutrality; 20 express departure was necessary in these, since the cases concerned both type of services, and type of suppliers, and the wording of those provisions often limits both their subjective and objective scope. 21 Yet, there was a clear sense that the above cases were the exception. Indeed there were also numerous examples of cases where fiscal neutrality was invoked by the parties as a basis for departing from strict interpretation, just to be expressly dismissed by the Court. 22 Overall the perception was that in the hierarchy of interpretative principles, under the traditional approach, strict interpretation had won the day. As the economy changed, this was however set to change.
III.2 Strict Interpretation vs. Fiscal Neutrality
In 2006 the European Commission stated that, the rule according to which the interpretation of exemptions must meet the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality was one of only three CJEU jurisprudential pillars as regards exemptions. 23 At the time, there was perhaps an element of wishful thinking to this statement, but it is true that by then the seeds of change were already being sown.
The reasons for the Court's progressive stronger emphasis on fiscal neutrality in the interpretation of exemptions appear to be two-fold. The first, and perhaps most important, element has been the changes in economic reality, and in particular insofar as services covered by merit exemptions were concerned, these changes were massive. Whilst in 1970s most of these services were performed by public entities, now they are also supplied by private entities, operating in market conditions; new services have also flooded the market, primarily as regards medical activities, and few in 1970s could have envisaged the medical developments in the use of steam cells, or cloning. In addition, the form in services covered by both merit and technical exemptions are now supplied has also fundamentally changed; in particular, there is an increased resource to new efficiencymaximisation economic structures, such as outsourcing, which in turn have increased the -already existing -problem of irrecoverable input VAT. The second reason for the Court's stronger emphasis on fiscal neutrality appears to be a simple accumulation of knowledge and experience. In the past, it had often, and rightly, been accused of over-simplistic approach to tax matters, including VAT exemptions. Seen in that light this new approach represents a natural jurisprudential evolution, witnessed in other areas, whereby there is a move towards a more complex, nuanced, interpretation of VAT rules, based on general VAT principles.
Regardless of the rationale, however, the CJEU stronger emphasis on fiscal neutrality in the interpretation of exemptions has resulted in a lesser emphasis on strict interpretation, and a constant dialectic struggle between strict interpretation and fiscal neutrality. Why, one may ask? Id est, why is the preference for strict interpretation usually accompanied by a dismissal of fiscal neutrality, and vice-versa? The answer lies in the nature of exemptions; they are inherently non-neutral, they constitute in themselves a violation of the principle of fiscal neutrality. This inherent paradox has been implicitly acknowledged by the Court, and expressly acknowledged by AG Jacobs over a decade ago:
'It is inherent in the existence of exceptions to the VAT system that they will interfere to some extent with the application of the principles of neutrality and of equality treatment. Whatever the merits of the decision […] , it forms an integral part of the Directive. In that in comparable situations, the treatment of taxable persons and persons excluded from the VAT system will inevitably be different.' 24 So that, in essence, interpreting exemptions often requires a choice between obliging one or the other of the two fundamental principles of VAT. Interpreting exemptions in line with principle of VAT as general tax on consumption will naturally lead to a strict interpretation of those exemptions; interpreting exemptions in line with principle of fiscal neutrality may lead to a non-strict, even broad, interpretation of those exemptions.
There are many examples for this recurrent dialectic struggle between strict interpretation and fiscal neutrality; cases which, on the facts, seemed all too similar, and yet were decided differently. 25 On the interpretation of exemptions for medical services, there is Bulthuis-Griffioen on side, and Gregg on the other; 26 as regards the interpretation of the exemption for sports activities, Stockholm Lindopark, on one side, and Canterbury Hockey. 27 Recent decisions in gambling, as well as in fund management services, however, are not only further evidence of this dialectic struggle, but also of its intensification. In so far as the exemption applicable to gambling services is concerned, the CJEU had already stated in various cases that the principle of fiscal neutrality limits the level of discretion granted to Member States under Article 135(1)(i) of the VAT Directive, in particular: fiscal neutrality precludes Member States from treating unlawful gambling as taxable, and lawful gambling as exempt; 28 it precludes Member States from treating private gambling as taxable, and lawful gambling as exempt; 29 and it means that outsourcing and subcontracting of gambling activities can still fall within scope of exemption. 30 Yet, the an interpretation based on the principle of fiscal neutrality was dismissed in the recent Leo-Libera case, where the Court held that Member States may treat one form of gambling as exempt, and another as taxable, as long as they are not in competition with each other. 31 Less than a year later, this decision was followed by what has been regarded as a landmark decision insofar as the principle of fiscal neutrality goes: Rank Group. 32 The case established, for the first time, a neutrality test, namely it ruled that the different treatment of two supplies of services which are: (a) identical or similar from the point of view of the consumer and; (b) which meet the same needs of the consumer, is sufficient to establish an infringement of the principle of fiscal neutrality. 33 It has therefore massive implications, not only for the interpretation of exemptions, but also, as discussed below, for the interpretation of rate provisions.
So that, in the space of less than two years, there were three CJEU decisions as regards the scope of the VAT exemption applicable to gambling services. In two of these the Court decided on the basis of the principle of fiscal neutrality, and in the other on the basis of the principle strict interpretation.
As regards the exemption applicable to management services of special investment funds, it is clear that the principle of fiscal neutrality has played a crucial role in determining the scope of Article 135(1)(g) of the VAT Directive, in particular: fiscal neutrality means that outsourcing and subcontracting of activities relating to management services of special investment funds can still fall within scope of exemption, as long as they form a distinct whole, and are specific to, and essential for, the management of those funds; 34 and it precludes Member States from treating management of open-ended funds as exempt, and management of closed-ended funds as taxable. 35 Yet the application of the principle was dismissed in two recent cases, in favour of strict interpretation. It was held that strict interpretation precluded Member States from treating portfolio management activity as falling within the scope of the exemption, 36 and from treating investment funds pooling the assets of a retirement pension scheme as a "special investment fund", since those funds were not 'sufficiently comparable' to be regarded in competition with exempt ones. 37 In one of these in particular, Deutsche Bank, the dismissal of the application of the principle of fiscal neutrality was expressly stated by the Court: 
'[the principle of fiscal neutrality] cannot extend the scope of an exemption in the absence of clear wording to that effect. That principle is not a rule of primary law which can condition the validity of an exemption, but a principle of interpretation, to be applied concurrently with the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions' 38
In the same year that it decided on these two cases, however, the Court decided on another case concerning the scope of this exemption, based on the principle of fiscal neutrality, holding that the principle meant that outsourcing of advisory services concerning investment in transferable securities still fell within its scope. 39 So that in the period of approximately one year, it decided on the basis of strict interpretation in two cases, and on the basis of fiscal neutrality in one other. Table 2 presents a recent sample of cases on the interpretation of the scope of VAT exemptions, essentially all the cases decided on the topic in the last four years. For each case it is identified whether the CJEU decided -explicitly or implicitly -on the basis of the principle of fiscal neutrality, or on the basis of the principle of strict interpretation. Making a breakdown of these thirty cases, according to the interpretative method adopted, the result is as follows: in four cases the CJEU did not decide either on the basis of fiscal neutrality, or of strict interpretation; 40 
Diagram 1: Breakdown of VAT Exemptions Cases Decided on the Basis of the Fiscal Neutrality Principle
Whilst of course not meant to be taken as an accurate method of determining the Court's preferences as regards interpretative methods, this rough analysis does highlight not only a growing preference for fiscal neutrality, but also the increasingly casuistic nature of interpreting VAT exemptions. Indeed, whilst a propensity can be identified as regards some of the exemptions for either strict interpretation or fiscal neutrality -for example the Court appears to be more likely to adopt a strict interpretation of immovable property exemptions -it is also clearly the case that there is no exemption rule which has been interpreted exclusively on the basis of strict interpretation, or exclusively on the basis of fiscal neutrality. Total VAT Cases
VAT Neutrality Cases
Similar tendencies can also be observed, albeit to a lesser extent given the lower numbers, in cases concerning the interpretation of rates' provisions.
IV. Role of Neutrality on Interpretation of Rates
The acknowledgement by the Court of the role of fiscal neutrality, and of VAT uniformity or equal treatment as its corollary, in the interpretation of VAT rates, was a more recent development than the similar acknowledgement in the field of exemptions. Indeed, the first time its interpretative role was recognised was in Commission v France, a case dating back to the late 1990s. 41
IV.1 Fiscal Neutrality Criteria
It resulted from that case also that, the criterion used to determine whether or not a dissimilar VAT treatment violated the principle of fiscal neutrality seemed to have been whether the goods in question were or not in competition with each other, as follows: 44 until that decision the criterion used to determine whether or not different VAT treatments of two products violated the principle of fiscal neutrality was in essence whether the goods in question were or not in competition with each other.
In Rank Group the CJEU revised this approach in a decision that would emerge as a key development for the principle of fiscal neutrality. 45 In it, the Court, relying upon an old judgment concerning excise duties, 46 sets-out a two-part test for establishing whether or not there is an infringement of fiscal neutrality, namely whether the products being treated differently for VAT purposes are comparable from point of view of the customer, and meet the same customers' needs.
Whilst the decision concerned exemptions, 47 it was as regards the application of rates that the establishment of the neutrality 22 test had an immediate impact. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the decision some were quick to point out that that it was 'highly likely' that the criteria laid down in Rank Group would affect the application of VAT rates particularly to food, and that 'the entire fabric of the manner in which VAT is applied to food' would have to be re-examined. 48 The proposition seemed even more convincing in the context of another decision of the CJEU that same year concerning the interpretation of the term 'foodstuff' in the Directive: Bog, where the Court, 49 without ever referring to fiscal neutrality, clearly departed from strict interpretation of exceptions to the general rule, by adopting a broad meaning of that term.
With these two decisions in the same year, reliance on fiscal neutrality appeared clearly on the rise, but this perception was short-lived.
IV.2 Strict interpretation vs. Fiscal Neutrality
In the last year a number of high profile cases on the application of reduced rates arrived to the CJEU raising the debate as to whether the Court would apply (or not) the new criteria for fiscal neutrality, as set out in Rank Group, to these cases. At stake in all of them was the interpretation of the word 'books', and whether the provision in the VAT Directive which allows 'books' to be subject to a reduced rate of VAT should be extended to similar products which did not exist at the time the Directive was approved, namely audio books, and e-books.
The cases therefore represented the perfect opportunity to test, not only the applicability of the new criteria set out in Rank Group-was it to be confirmed as the new standard for fiscal neutrality? -but importantly also, to test the strength of fiscal neutrality itself, now that a test was available. 50 The first question was clearly answered: in all cases the Court reiterated the Rank Group test, confirming it as the criteria for establishing potential infringements of the principle fiscal neutrality. As regards the second aspect, however, namely the strength of the principle itself, this was considerably less clear.
In the first of this group of cases concerning non-physical books, and namely audio books, the (3 rd Chamber of the) CJEU left the decision to the national court on whether applying a VAT reduced rate to -hardcopy -books, but not to audio books, violated the principle of fiscal neutrality, as follows: Yet, barely six months later, in two other decisions on the same theme, the (4 th Chamber of the) Court, whilst reiterating the Rank Group test, ruled that the principle of fiscal neutrality cannot extend the scope of reduced rates of VAT to the supply of electronic books. 52 How to explain these apparently opposing decisions? Apart from the potential impact of the practical dynamics of having similar cases being decided by different chambers, the only (acceptable) legal answer is that the difference results from the ongoing dialectics between the principle of strict interpretation, and the principle of fiscal neutrality.
V. Concluding Remarks: Centrality of Neutrality for Future Debates
The rules concerning exclusions from the VAT base, namely exemptions and rates, date in their majority to the introduction of the European VAT system. A changing, globalised, economy requires adapting those, unavoidably outdated provisions to new economic realities. Against this background, the CJEU response has been an increased reliance on general principles of the VAT system, and in particular the principle of fiscal neutrality, as interpretative aids. This growing tendency is certainly praise-worthy: not only does it represent a more sophisticated approach to the legal interpretation of rules excluding specific goods and services from the tax base; but, in the absence of political will to remove those exclusions, it assists in the construction of the least distortive, more neutral, system possible in the presence of exclusions. However, it does also present significant challenges. Indeed, the inherent paradox between the two fundamental principles of the European VAT system, namely that of VAT as tax on consumption and that of fiscal neutrality, means in practice that the CJEU is faced with a very difficult choice. In essence, as set out in Table 3 , the more neutral the system is, the more uncertain it is also, and the bigger the erosion of the tax base.  Further erosion of the tax base. 
